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UNNATURAL DOUBTS 
 
 
DUNCAN PRITCHARD 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
ABSTRACT. The goal of this paper is to critique the prominent inferential contextualist response 
to radical scepticism offered by Michael Williams. A core criticism is that Williams fails to 
recognise that the sceptical problem that he engages with is not a single problem at all, but 
rather two logically distinct difficulties which trade on separate sceptical claims. It is further 
argued that the Wittgenstein-inspired account of “methodological necessities” that Williams 
offers is fundamentally flawed, and that he would have been better to have stuck more closely 
to Wittgenstein’s own characterisation of hinge commitments. Inferential contextualism is also 
independently shown to be problematic in various ways, not least in the manner in which it is 
in danger of collapsing into a form of epistemic relativism. It is argued that the right way to 
deal with the sceptical problem involves allying a Wittgensteinian account of the structure of 
rational evaluation with a radical thesis about the nature of perceptual knowledge in paradigm 
epistemic conditions, known as epistemological disjunctivism. 
 
 
0. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
In my view, Michael Williams’s magisterial book on Cartesian radical scepticism, Unnatural Doubts 
(Williams 1991), is one of the most important works in epistemology, if not philosophy more 
generally, of the last fifty years.1 Indeed, it is one of two books on the subject by living 
philosophers that have between them shaped much of my thinking about the problem. The other 
is Barry Stroud’s (1984) seminal monograph, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, a book which 
resurrected radical scepticism as a bona fide philosophical problem, and which arguably provided 
much of the philosophical context for Unnatural Doubts. In short, Stroud resurrected the problem 
of radical scepticism, and then Williams came along and offered a highly compelling response to 
this difficulty. Like Williams, my ultimate concern is to undermine radical scepticism; to show that 
it is in an important sense a ‘fake’ philosophical problem, in that while it wears the cloak of 
commonsense it in fact trades on dubious theoretical claims that should be rejected. Here we both 
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depart from Stroud, despite our common sympathy for his presentation of both the problem itself 
and why it is philosophically significant. Like Williams, my way of thinking about radical 
scepticism is also influenced by Wittgenstein’s (1969) gnomic remarks in On Certainty on the nature 
of knowledge and certainty. But while there is a lot to admire in Williams’s treatment of the 
sceptical problem, and while there are also important commonalities in our respective ways of 
responding to this difficulty, I also think that Williams’s response to radical scepticism goes awry 
at critical junctures, and this is the topic of the paper.  
 To this end we will be exploring the anti-sceptical proposal that Williams puts forward, 
what I have elsewhere described as inferential contextualism.2 In particular, the goal is to identify what 
Williams’s gets right in his response to radical scepticism, and also to pick out those points on 
which he errs. Before we can get to Williams’s proposal, however, we first need to describe the 
Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation and the related notion of a hinge 
commitment, as this provides the crucial context both for understanding Williams’s view, and also 
for understanding why it does not achieve its intended target.  
 
 
1. WITTGENSTEIN ON THE STRUCTURE OF RATIONAL EVALUATION 
 
In his final notebooks, published as On Certainty [OC], Wittgenstein offers us a strikingly original 
account of the structure of rational evaluation. Central to this proposal is the idea of hinge 
commitments. These concern that which we are optimally certain of, the so-called ‘Moorean’ 
propositions, such as ‘I have two hands’. Moore (1925; 1939) noted that the optimal certainty that 
we accord to such propositions seems to allow them to play an important epistemic role our 
practices of epistemic evaluation. But while Moore thought that this optimal certainty revealed a 
special kind of epistemic status, Wittgenstein instead argues that the exact opposite is the case, in 
that our hinge commitments are essentially groundless. Indeed, not only are they essentially 
groundless, but they cannot be subject to rational doubt either. This is because they form the 
framework relative to which any rational evaluation occurs, whether positive or negative.  
 As we might expect from unedited notebooks containing impressionistic remarks, 
Wittgenstein doesn’t offer a straightforward argument for this account of our hinge commitments. 
Rather he offers a series of examples that highlight the implausibility both of doubt of a hinge 
commitment being rational and of the idea that we could regard such commitments as rationally 
grounded. Consider the following passage: 
 
If a blind man were to ask me “Have you got two hands?” I should not make sure by looking. If I 
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were to have any doubt of it, then I don’t know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn’t I 
test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be tested by what? (OC, 
§125) 
 
Wittgenstein is suggesting that doubt of that which is optimally certain cannot be rational because 
it throws into question one’s entire system of beliefs, and thus the very putative rational basis of 
the doubt itself. Such a doubt, he writes, would “drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos.” 
(OC, §613) Doubt of a Moorean certainty is deemed akin to doubting everything, but Wittgenstein 
cautions that: 
 
If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of 
doubting itself presupposes certainty. (OC, §115) 
 
And elsewhere, “A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt.” (OC, §450; cf. OC, 
§§370; 490; 613)  
Something must thus stand fast for rational doubt to occur, and this is our bedrock of 
hinge commitments. But, crucially, Wittgenstein further argues⎯contrary to a certain brand of 
broadly Moorean anti-scepticism⎯that it does not follow that these hinge commitments have a 
special rational grounding, but rather that just as they cannot be rationally doubted, so they cannot 
be coherently thought of as rationally grounded either. Consider the following passage: 
 
My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I could produce in 
evidence for it. 
 That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it. (OC, 
§250) 
 
That is, just as one cannot make sense of a rational basis for doubt of a hinge commitment, for the 
very same reason one cannot make sense of a rational basis for belief of a hinge commitment 
either. Such commitments are thus essentially arational. 
 Relatedly, Wittgenstein also emphasises the point that our hinge commitments are neither 
acquired via rational processes nor responsive to rational considerations in the way that normal 
beliefs are. We’ve already the noted the latter point, in that we’ve seen how our hinge 
commitments are simply not responsive to rational considerations in the usual way⎯e.g., they are 
not susceptible to being undermined by rational doubt. Indeed, our hinge commitments are, 
instead, completely non-optional, and represent a visceral, “animal” (OC, §359), certainty. On the 
former point, Wittgenstein points out that we are never explicitly taught our hinge commitments, 
but we rather “swallow them down” in other things that we are taught. No one teaches you that 
you have two hands, for example, but lots of things that you are taught presuppose this 
commitment. In a similar vein, Wittgenstein notes that it takes a very special kind of inquiry⎯one 
that is specifically philosophical in nature⎯to bring our hinge commitments to the fore. In the 
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normal run of things, they “lie apart from the route travelled by inquiry.” (OC, §88)  
Putting all these points together, Wittgenstein argues for the necessity of hinge 
commitments for there to be rational evaluation, and thus he contends that⎯as a ‘matter of 
logic’⎯all rational evaluation is essentially local. Consider these famous remarks on our hinge 
commitments: 
 
[...] the questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions are 
exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. 
  That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are 
in deed not doubted. 
  But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that 
reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must 
stay put. (OC, §§341-3)3 
 
This point about how rational evaluation must be this way is very important to Wittgenstein’s anti-
scepticism, but it is often overlooked. Wittgenstein is quite emphatic that it is not a mere practical 
limitation on rational evaluation that he has in mind, such that if only we were cleverer, more 
imaginative, more conscientious, and so forth, then we would be able to make sense of the idea of 
a fully general rational evaluation. That these hinges stand fast for me, Wittgenstein (OC, §235) 
writes, is not “grounded in my stupidity or credulity.” (OC, §235) Rather his point is that the very 
idea of a fully general rational evaluation⎯i.e., a rational evaluation that isn’t relative to hinge 
commitments that are immune to rational evaluation⎯simply doesn’t make sense.4  
 
 
2. INFERENTIAL CONTEXTUALISM 
 
In the last section we saw the basic elements of Wittgenstein’s hinge-based response to radical 
scepticism. How should we go about converting this radical idea about the structure of rational 
evaluation into a coherent anti-sceptical thesis? One influential response to this question is the 
inferential contextualism advanced by Williams (1991), which is built around this general 
Wittgensteinian anti-sceptical line.  
 Williams agrees with Wittgenstein that all rational evaluation takes place relative to 
arational hinge commitments—or “methodological necessities” (Williams 1991, 123) as he 
describes them—such that there can no such thing as fully general rational evaluations. He 
accordingly rejects what he refers to as the “totality condition” (Williams 1991, 90) that is implicit 
in the traditional epistemological enterprise, such that it is possible to rationally evaluate all our 
beliefs at once. Williams further argues that the Cartesian sceptical problem essentially trades on 
the idea that fully general rational evaluations are possible, and hence that a rejection of the totality 
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conditions is thereby a rejection of this form of radical scepticism. Indeed, in a Wittgensteinian 
spirit Williams claims that radical scepticism is not the paradox that it purports to be, but rather 
trades on dubious theoretical claims masquerading as commonsense. Williams is therefore 
proposing what is known as an undercutting anti-sceptical strategy, one that has methodological 
necessities at its heart. That is, he is not granting that there is a bona fide paradox in play here and 
then motivating a revisionary epistemology to evade it (this would be an overriding anti-sceptical 
strategy), but rather aiming to show that once we clear-up our thinking about radical scepticism we 
discover that there is no sceptical paradox to evade.5  
Williams further argues that in accepting the Wittgensteinian line on hinges, and thus 
denying the totality condition, one is thereby also rejecting a metaphysical claim about the objects 
of epistemological study, a claim that he refers to as epistemological realism. This is the view that a 
proposition can have an inherent epistemic status in virtue of its content. In particular, Williams is 
especially interested in the idea, which he refers to as epistemic priority, that propositions concerning 
the ‘inner’ realm of one’s own mind (e.g., regarding one’s current mental states) have a privileged 
epistemic status relative to propositions concerning the ‘outer’ realm of an empirical world (e.g., 
regarding one’s immediate environment). Although Williams is never fully explicit about what he 
has in mind with regard to epistemic priority, we can get a good feel for his intentions from this 
passage: 
 
Beliefs to which no beliefs are epistemologically prior are epistemologically basic. Their credibility 
is naturally intrinsic, as that of all other beliefs is naturally inferential. (Williams 1991, 116) 
 
Whether or not claims about the inner realm are epistemologically basic, they are at least typically 
thought to be epistemologically prior to claims about the outer realm in this sense: the rational 
basis for an instance of the latter kind of claim must involve an inference from an instance of the 
former kind of claim. So, for example, rationally grounded knowledge that there is chair in front of 
one must be based on an inference from one’s beliefs about one’s mental states (e.g., regarding 
one’s experiences as of there being a chair before one).6  
Williams rejects epistemic priority. For Williams, what can be legitimately inferred relative 
to what is determined by the methodological necessities in play, and these vary from context to 
context. Thus while there may be contexts in which, say, one can only rationally infer external 
world claims from propositions regarding one’s mental states, there is no necessity in play here for 
there can be other contexts, no less legitimate, in which one can reasonably infer claims about 
one’s mental states from claims regarding the external world. This is why Williams’s view can be 
described as inferential contextualism.7  
More generally, Williams wants to reject not just epistemic priority but also the more 
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general thesis of epistemological realism. That is, not only is there not the kind of inherent 
epistemic status due to propositions of a certain type when it comes to the ‘inner/outer’ 
dichotomy, but there is also no such thing as an inherent epistemic status simpliciter. For Williams, 
inferential contextualism is just the denial of epistemological realism. As he puts it, it is the view 
that  
 
[…] the epistemic status of a given proposition is liable to shift with situational, disciplinary and 
other contextually variable factors: it is to hold that, independently of such influences, a 
proposition has no epistemic status whatsoever. (Williams 1991, 119) 
 
So to reject epistemological realism is to endorse inferential contextualism, and to reject inferential 
contextualism is to endorse epistemological realism.  
 We thus have the main contours of inferential contextualism. At its heart is the 
Wittgensteinian claim that all rational evaluation takes place relative to groundless hinge 
commitments, and that this is key to dissolving the radical sceptical problem. But Williams also 
argues that a denial of epistemological realism and epistemic priority is also required, and that the 
rejection of these theses falls out of the Wittgensteinian anti-sceptical picture.    
 There is a lot in Williams’s approach to radical scepticism that I agree with. As we will see, 
I also endorse the basic Wittgensteinian line that all rational evaluation is essentially local, in that it 
takes place relative to rationally groundless hinge commitments. Like Williams, I would thus also 
reject the totality condition. In addition, I agree with Williams that we should aspire to formulate 
an undercutting treatment of radical scepticism that demonstrates that the putative sceptical 
paradox is not bona fide. That said, there are also several fundamental points that I think Williams’s 
approach to radical scepticism gets wrong.  
 To begin with, although I would also reject epistemic priority, I don’t think that one can 
motivate a rejection of this claim by appeal to the Wittgensteinian thesis about the structure of 
rational evaluation. Rather, the explanation for why this claim should be rejected lies elsewhere. 
Relatedly, I don’t think one can motivate the rejection of epistemological realism by appeal to the 
Wittgensteinian thesis either. Indeed, I don’t think that rejecting this claim has any essential role to 
play in undermining this form of radical scepticism.  
 There are two key junctures where Williams’s anti-scepticism goes awry. The first is the 
way in which he interprets the Wittgensteinian account of our hinge commitments. As we will see, 
there is a better way of understanding Wittgenstein’s account of the structure of rational 
evaluation that doesn’t lead to inferential contextualism (and which is also less susceptible to 
epistemic relativism). The second is that Williams makes a common error in his treatment of 
radical scepticism in effectively running together two formulations of this problem, cast in terms 
of the underdetermination and closure principles.8 As we will see, these two formulations are 
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importantly different, with the Wittgensteinian approach to radical scepticism, properly 
understood, only really applicable to the latter. By effectively trying to extract a solution to both 
formulations by appeal only to a hinge epistemology, Williams ends up with a response to radical 
scepticism that has an important lacuna. We will be taking these two points in turn.  
 
 
3. CONTRA METHODOLOGICAL NECESSITIES 
 
The kind of examples of hinge commitments that Wittgenstein offers us can, at first blush anyway, 
make them seem like an heterogeneous bunch. Accordingly, we might wonder what they have in 
common, aside from the fact that they concern propositions that we are optimally certain about. I 
think there is a straightforward way of de-mystifying the nature of our hinge commitments, 
however. The way to do this is to recognise that all of our hinge commitments essentially codify, 
and thus manifest, our fundamental hinge commitment that we are not radically and 
fundamentally mistaken in our beliefs. Call this the über hinge commitment.  
There are a number of advantages of thinking about our hinge commitments in this way.9 
For example, one key advantage is that it helps us to see why rational evaluation must be 
essentially local. For what possible reason could we have for holding the über hinge commitment? 
Whatever grounds we cited would already presuppose the truth of this commitment after all. 
Notice, too, that this way of thinking about our hinge commitments underlines Wittgenstein’s 
point that there is nothing contingent about the limitation on rational evaluation that the existence 
of our hinge commitments reveals. It is not as though, for example, if we had been more careful 
or thorough in how we acquired rational support for our beliefs then we could have avoided this 
fate, since there simply is no rational process through which we could have gained rational support 
for belief in the über hinge proposition. And since we are unable to have a rationally supported 
belief in the über hinge proposition, it follows that we are unable to have rationally supported 
beliefs in the various other more specific commitments that we have which codify our über hinge 
commitment. We thus get the Wittgensteinian conclusion: since all rational evaluation necessarily 
takes place relative to groundless hinge commitments, hence the very idea of a fully general 
rational evaluation⎯i.e., one which does not presuppose any hinge commitments⎯is incoherent, 
whether that evaluation is positive (i.e., anti-sceptical) or negative (i.e., sceptical). The universality 
of rational evaluation thesis is thus rejected.  
Williams’s conception of hinge propositions as methodological necessities is very different 
to the conception of hinges just offered. For example, Williams regards methodological necessities 
as being dependent on the kind of inquiry one is engaging in. So, to take an example that Williams 
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is fond of, consider the methodological necessities in play when we are conducting an historical 
inquiry: 
 
For a subject like history, there is more to method than abstract procedural rules. This is because 
the exclusion of certain questions (about the existence of the Earth, the complete and total 
unreliability of documentary evidence, etc.) amounts to the acceptance of substantial factual 
commitments. These commitments, which must be accepted, if what we understand by historical 
inquiry at all, have the status, relative to that form of inquiry, of methodological necessities. (Williams 
1991, 123, italics in original)    
 
The methodological necessities of historical inquiry will thus include claims about the reality of the 
past and about the reliability of documentary evidence, where these claims are not methodological 
necessities of some other kinds of inquiry. Hence, a change in one’s inquiries can lead to a change 
in one’s methodological necessities, and thus one’s hinge commitments.  
We should note straight away one feature of Williams’ conception of hinge commitments 
that is very much in tension with the way Wittgenstein describes these commitments in On 
Certainty.10 Which inquiries one undertakes is a matter of choice, after all, and hence on this view 
which methodological necessities one has at a particular point of time can be a matter of choice 
too, at least insofar as one is aware that certain inquiries demand certain methodological 
necessities. But can we really make sense of our hinge commitments as being optional in this way? 
Isn’t the commitment in play meant to be visceral, an ‘animal’ commitment? How could we square 
this way of thinking about hinge commitments with them being optional? 
We can further bring out the odd nature of Williams’s conception of hinge commitments 
by asking what sort of inquiry would lack any of the methodological necessities that Williams 
claims is distinctive of history. The way that Williams writes about methodological necessities 
suggests that there ought to be a range of inquiries which don’t incorporate any of these 
commitments⎯they are particular to a specifically historical inquiry, after all. And yet once one 
reflects on the matter, it is hard to think of a specific inquiry that doesn’t, for example, presuppose 
the reality of the past. Aren’t commitments such as this simply consequences of the über hinge 
commitment? And if so, doesn’t this mean that they are entirely general hinge commitments, and 
not relative to a particular kind of inquiry? Moreover, so conceived, shouldn’t they have the same 
kind of properties as our other hinge commitments, such as being non-optional (etc.,)?11  
Tellingly, the only inquiry which Williams offers as an example of an investigation which 
lacks any of the methodological necessities involved in doing history is that of the traditional 
epistemological enterprise, where by this he means the kind of fully general rational evaluation of 
our epistemic standing which is undertaken by the radical sceptic and the conventional (e.g., 
Moorean) anti-sceptic. A key part of Williams’s diagnosis of radical scepticism is the observation 
that there is a sense in which scepticism is correct, albeit not (as it purports to be) as an 
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acontextual thesis, but only relative to a particular set of methodological necessities. In particular, 
Williams argues that a hinge commitment to epistemological realism underlies traditional 
epistemology, and hence underlies the sceptical challenge too, such that it is only relative to this 
ungrounded methodological necessity that sceptical inquiry can take place. Here is Williams: 
 
The sceptic takes himself to have discovered, under the conditions of philosophical reflection, that 
knowledge of the world is impossible. But in fact, the most he has discovered is that knowledge of 
the world is impossible under the conditions of philosophical reflection. (Williams 1991, 130, italics in original) 
 
We thus get another sense in which Williams is a contextualist, for not only are methodological 
necessities relative to contexts more generally, but also there is a specific context in which 
scepticism itself is legitimate. As we might put it, there is, on Williams’s view, a truth in radical 
scepticism, although it is not quite the truth that the radical sceptic herself offers.  
 This is a general move that contextualist anti-sceptical strategies make of course, though 
there is a crucial difference between standard contextualism and Williams’s inferential 
contextualism. For usually the contextualist idea is that the context in which radical scepticism is 
presented involves higher epistemic standards with regards to knowledge ascriptions. There is thus 
a hierarchy of contexts differentiated in terms of the epistemic standards they employ.12 In 
contrast, for Williams there is no such anti-sceptical appeal to a raising of epistemic standards. In 
particular, contexts for Williams are not ordered in terms of a hierarchy of epistemic standards. 
Rather each context incorporates its own internal epistemic standards, as determined by the 
methodological necessities, and hence inferential structure, in play. Indeed, since all epistemic 
evaluation is relative to some context or other (and thus to some particular set of methodological 
necessities), on Williams’s view there is simply no sense in the idea that we can rank contexts in 
terms how epistemically demanding they are, as the attributer contextualist supposes. For this 
would be to undertake the very kind of extra-contextual epistemic evaluation that Williams claims 
is impossible.   
 Although Williams’s rejection of an epistemic hierarchy of contexts is more 
Wittgensteinian in spirit than standard contextualism, there is nonetheless something deeply 
suspect about allying the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation to 
contextualism of any variety. For although there are obviously no rational constraints on what can 
count as a methodological necessity⎯since they are by their nature immune to rational 
evaluation⎯even on Williams’s view the methodological necessities must be true if that context is 
to yield rationally grounded knowledge. But if Williams has shown, on purely a priori grounds, that 
epistemological realism is false, then it follows that the sceptical context is simply defunct (i.e., 
relative to any inferential context). There is thus nothing for the sceptic to ‘discover’ as part of 
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their epistemological inquiry. Discovery implies knowledge, after all, and since the methodological 
necessities of this context are false no knowledge can be produced by it (not even of a qualified 
context-dependent form).    
 Indeed, notice that we do not have to go so far as to accept Williams’s rejection of 
epistemological realism in order to make this point. The rejection, on Wittgensteinian grounds, of 
the very idea of a fully general rational evaluation will suffice by itself to undermine the project of 
traditional epistemological inquiry as Williams understands it⎯i.e., such that it essentially 
incorporates the totality condition. This means that the rejection of the totality condition is 
enough to ensure that the radical sceptic’s context is epistemically illegitimate⎯such that radical 
sceptical reasoning cannot lead to rationally grounded knowledge⎯even if it turns out that 
epistemological realism is true. (Or, at least, this would be so if we were entitled to accept, with 
Williams, that there is just one kind of sceptical problem in play here, and therefore that only one 
diagnosis is needed⎯we will return to this point below).  
 Once we reject the idea of there being a bona fide radical sceptical context⎯in the sense of 
potentially generating rationally grounded knowledge⎯what is left of the contextualist element of 
inferential contextualism? Everything now depends on whether methodological necessities really 
are variable across (non-sceptical) contexts in the way that Williams suggests, since without this 
claim there is nothing specifically contextualist about his proposal. But we have already seen that 
this is highly dubious. A conviction in the reality of the past is not merely a hinge commitment of 
historical inquiry, but of any inquiry. And we can explain this via our Wittgensteinian account in 
terms of how this commitment codifies the über hinge commitment. Hinge commitments on this 
view are never optional, nor are they, relatedly, the kind of commitment that comes and goes as 
one switches from one investigation to another.  
 This brings us to a final point of contrast between inferential contextualism and our 
Wittgensteinian proposal, which is that Williams’s view seems completely unable to resist epistemic 
relativism. By epistemic relativism I have in mind the possibility of a specifically epistemic 
incommensurability, such that two agents have completely different hinge commitments and 
hence employ two completely distinct systems of rational evaluation. The upshot would be that 
where these two systems come into conflict, both agents could form their conflicting beliefs 
rationally and there is no way, even in principle, to rationally resolve their dispute.13  
Far from being an undesirable possibility that Williams wishes to avoid, epistemic 
relativism seems instead to be a straightforward consequence of inferential contextualism as he 
understands this view. Here is Williams on just this point: 
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As a rule, when people’s beliefs differ profoundly, there is no guarantee that there will be neutral 
epistemic principles for determining who is right and who is wrong. (Williams 2007, 111) 
  
Here we have a straightforward endorsement of what we are here calling epistemic 
incommensurability, and hence epistemic relativism.14  
 Note, however, that epistemic relativism, so conceived, is not a direct consequence of the 
Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation, at least not as we have developed 
this view. That all rational evaluation takes place relative to hinge commitments is entirely 
compatible with there being a great deal of overlap in subjects’ hinge commitments, even when 
they are from very different cultures. So the question we need to ask is whether there can be 
radical divergence in one’s hinge commitments. Inferential contextualism seems committed to 
allowing this, at least to the extent that we can make sense of this proposal as a contextualist thesis 
at all, but insofar as we reject inferential contextualism then the way is at least open to denying this 
possibility.  
 Interestingly, there are passages in On Certainty that suggest that Wittgenstein himself 
wanted to limit the extent to which there can be divergence of hinge commitments. In particular, 
he suggests that a divergence of hinge commitments that was too great would be incompatible 
with one’s thoughts even being intelligible. Consider these passages: 
 
The truth of my statements is the test of my understanding of these statements. That is to say: if I 
make certain false statements, it becomes uncertain whether I understand them. (OC, §§80-1) 
 
In order to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with mankind. (OC, §156)  
 
If this is right, then we can at least count on a dispute between two agents who are intelligible to 
one another as involving a shared background of beliefs, and hence as having shared hinge 
commitments. There is thus no inherent reason why epistemic incommensurability should be 
possible on this view. That is, while there will be all the usual practical problems associated with 
resolving entrenched disagreements, it seems we can avoid the in principle problems posed by 
epistemic incommensurability, and which lead to epistemic relativism.15  
   
 
4. TWO SOURCES OF SCEPTICISM 
 
This brings us to the second point on which Williams’s anti-scepticism goes awry, which is his 
failure to see that there are two sceptical problems in play here, one which trades on the closure 
principle and a second formulation which trades on the underdetermination principle. To be fair, 
Williams is not alone in overlooking this point, in that it is common in the contemporary literature 
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on radical scepticism to run together two formulations of the problem. 
 We begin with the closure-based formulation of the sceptical problem, since this has now 
become the most common formulation of the problem in the literature. We will focus our 
attention on rationally grounded knowledge, in order to side-step issues that might arise with 
knowledge that lacks a rational grounding.16 In order to simplify things, we will formulate the 
sceptical problem as it concerns an agent’s rationally grounded knowledge of an ‘everyday’ 
empirical proposition (‘E’), the kind of proposition which is typically thought to be known, and 
where the belief in question is regarded as rationally grounded. If one has rationally grounded 
knowledge of these everyday empirical propositions, then the challenge posed by radical 
scepticism is illusory. We will also focus on a specific radical sceptical hypothesis which is by 
stipulation incompatible with E⎯viz., the hypothesis that, unbeknownst to one, one is a brain-in-
a-vat (BIV) being ‘fed’ one’s experiences by supercomputers.  
 With these stipulations in mind, here is the closure-based radical sceptical paradox: 
 
The Closure-Based Radical Sceptical Paradox 
(S11) One cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV. 
(S12) If one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV, then one cannot 
have rationally grounded knowledge that E. 
(S13) I have rationally grounded knowledge that E.17 
 
(S11) is motivated by the general thought that one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that 
one is not the victim of a radical sceptical hypothesis. Given that, ex hypothesi, one cannot 
distinguish between one’s ordinary experiences and the corresponding experiences that one would 
have if one were a BIV, then how could one have a rational basis for knowing that one is not a 
BIV?18 (S13) is motivated by the general anti-sceptical thought noted above that E-type 
propositions are widely known, where this knowledge is rationally grounded. 
 That leaves us with the second claim, (S12). This is motivated by appeal to the following 
principle:    
 
The Closure Principle  
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby 
forming a belief that q on this basis while retaining her rationally grounded knowledge that p, then 
S has rationally grounded knowledge that q. 
 
With the closure principle in play, it follows that if one did have rationally grounded knowledge 
that E, then one could competently deduce from this knowledge that one is not a BIV, and 
thereby acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV.19 Conversely, if it is already 
granted that one simply cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV, it 
follows that one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that E either. We thus get (S12). 
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The guiding thought behind the closure principle is that competent deduction is a 
paradigm instance of a rational process. Accordingly, any belief which is grounded on a competent 
deduction from rationally grounded knowledge⎯and where the original rationally grounded 
knowledge is preserved throughout the deduction⎯cannot be itself any less rationally grounded. 
There are, of course, weaker formulations of closure-style principles in this general vein in the 
literature, and some of them have been rejected for various reasons.20 But it is hard to see how one 
could motivate a rejection of the principle as just formulated, which is why the debate about 
closure-based radical scepticism is now generally targeted on this specific formulation. How could 
one have rationally grounded knowledge, competently deduce a belief on this basis (while retaining 
the original rationally grounded knowledge), and yet lack rationally grounded knowledge of the 
proposition deduced? At the very least, any anti-sceptical strategy that proceeds by rejecting this 
principle will face a steep up-hill task.   
 Since the three claims that make up this paradox are in logical conflict with one another, so 
we know that at least one of them must be false. But since they are all highly intuitive, or at least 
supported by highly intuitive claims (such as the closure principle), it is hard to see which is to go.  
Next, consider the second way of expressing the radical sceptical paradox, which turns on 
the underdetermination principle: 
 
The Underdetermination-Based Radical Sceptical Paradox 
(S21) One cannot have a rational basis that favours one’s belief that E over the BIV scenario. 
(S22) If one cannot have a rational basis that favours one’s belief that E over the BIV scenario, 
then one lacks rationally grounded knowledge that E. 
(S23) I have rationally grounded knowledge that E.21 
 
As with the closure-based formulation of the radical sceptical paradox, these three claims are 
clearly in logical conflict, and hence we know that at least one of them must be false. The final 
claim that makes up the underdetermination-based radical sceptical paradox is identical to the final 
claim that makes up the closure-based radical sceptical paradox, so we can focus our attention on 
the other two.  
The first claim, (S21), captures a widely held commitment in epistemology to the so-called 
new evil demon intuition. Consider two agents. The first is in normal epistemic conditions⎯call this 
the good case. The second, in contrast, is an identical counterpart of the first but unfortunately the 
victim of a radical sceptical hypothesis (such as the BIV hypothesis)⎯call this the bad case. It is by 
stipulation impossible for either subject to distinguish between their experiences and those had by 
their counterpart. The new evil demon intuition is the claim that the first agent in the good case 
cannot have a better rational basis for her beliefs than her counterpart in the bad case does for her 
corresponding beliefs. After all, given that the good and bad cases are indistinguishable to the 
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subjects concerned, how could the agent in the good case have a better rational standing for her 
beliefs than her counterpart in the bad case?22  
The second claim in the underdetermination-based formulation of radical scepticism, (S22), 
is meant to be derived from the following underdetermination principle: 
 
The Underdetermination Principle 
If S knows that p and q describe incompatible scenarios, and yet S lacks a rational basis that 
favours belief that p over q, then S lacks rationally grounded knowledge that p. 
 
With this principle in play, it follows that if one lacks a rational basis which favours E over the 
BIV alternative, then one lacks rationally support knowledge that E. We thus get (S22). 
 The underdetermination principle is meant to be entirely uncontentious. Consider what it 
would mean for it to be false. This would entail that one could have rationally grounded 
knowledge of a proposition even while recognising that the proposition believed was incompatible 
with an alternative scenario and that one’s rational basis for one’s belief didn’t favour it over the 
alternative scenario. An example might be having rationally grounded knowledge that one is seated 
even while recognising that one has no better reason for thinking that one is seated than that one 
is standing (a known to be incompatible alternative). Although there might be some dispute over 
what is involved in having rationally grounded knowledge, we would surely want a conception of 
this kind of knowledge such that it excluded this possibility.  
 These two formulations of the radical sceptical paradox are clearly very similar. They share a 
claim, and the sceptical challenge posed in each case is the same. Moreover, they can each be 
formulated in terms of a conflict between our rationally grounded knowledge of an everyday 
proposition, E, and an epistemic lack which is exposed by radical sceptical hypotheses, in this case 
the BIV hypothesis. Crucially, however, these two formulations of the sceptical problem are 
logically distinct, and this is because the epistemic demands made by the two epistemic principles 
on which they turn are subtly different.  
 We can evaluate the relative logical strengths of these two epistemic principles by 
considering, in a simplified and analogous fashion, what each principle demands in the particular 
case of a subject’s belief that E in the context of the BIV sceptical hypothesis: 
 
The Simplified Closure-Based Entailment 
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that E, then S has rationally grounded knowledge that she 
is not a BIV. 
 
The Simplified Underdetermination-Based Entailment 
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that E, then S has rational support for her belief that E 
which favours that belief over the sceptical alternative that she is a BIV. 
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I take it that the simplified closure-based entailment is an obvious, and uncontentious, 
simplification of what the closure principle demands in this case. That the simplified 
underdetermination-based entailment is a simplification of what the underdetermination principle 
demands is not so obvious, but that is because we are effectively working with a contraposed 
version of the principle. Uncontraposed, the entailment would be that if one lacks a rational basis 
which favours belief that E over the alternative sceptical scenario that one is a BIV, then one lacks 
rationally grounded knowledge that E. The reason why it is useful to work with a contraposed 
version of this claim is that the underdetermination-based entailment will then share its antecedent 
with the simplified closure-based entailment. We can thus focus our attention on what is entailed 
in each case.   
With the entailments generated by the underdetermination and closure principles 
simplified in this way, we can detect one obvious difference between them. This is that whereas 
the simplified closure-based entailment demands that one has rationally grounded knowledge that 
one is not a BIV, the simplified underdetermination-based entailment merely demands that one has 
a rational basis which favours belief that E over the BIV alternative. The former claim is much 
more demanding than the latter claim, in that one can have better reasons for believing E rather 
than the BIV hypothesis without thereby possessing rationally grounded knowledge that one is not 
a BIV. In particular, while having better reason to believe that E as opposed to the BIV hypothesis 
plausibly entails that one has some reason for believing that one is not a BIV, it would be a stretch 
to maintain that this by itself entails that one has rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV 
(even granted that the entailed belief in question will be true). There is thus a strong prima facie 
basis for arguing that the underdetermination principle is logically weaker than the closure 
principle, in the sense that from the same antecedent the former principle extracts a logically 
weaker consequent. 
This point is confirmed once we reflect on the logical relationships in the other 
direction⎯viz., from the closure principle to the underdetermination principle. For notice that if 
one has rationally grounded knowledge that E, and one thereby has rationally grounded 
knowledge, via the closure principle, that one is not a BIV, then of course one inevitably has a 
rational basis for which favours E over the alternative sceptical scenario that is a BIV. One has, 
after all, rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV. The closure principle is thus more 
demanding than the underdetermination principle.  
What this means for our dealings with the two formulations of the sceptical argument is 
not straightforward, since it depends on what anti-sceptical strategy one opts for. For example, if 
we were to approach underdetermination-based scepticism by denying the underdetermination 
principle, then that would obviously suggest a response to closure-based scepticism which 
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involved denying the closure principle. But if one opts to retain the underdetermination principle, 
then there would be various options available for dealing with closure-based scepticism. In any 
case, the crux of the matter is that we need to be sensitive to the subtle differences between these 
formulations of scepticism, and that this works against Williams’s treatment of the problem.  
In particular, notice that the difference between the two formulations of the sceptical 
problem reflect two distinct motivations for scepticism, even though the sceptical upshot is the 
same. Closure-based scepticism arises out of a commitment to what we might term the universality 
of rational evaluation, where this involves the thought that there are no in principle limitations on the 
scope of rational evaluation. This commitment is revealed in the fact that via closure-based 
inferences we can, it seems, harmlessly shift our focus from local rational evaluations to global 
rational evaluations, as when we query the rational basis of our hinge commitments. 
Underdetermination-based scepticism, in contrast, is concerned with what we might term the 
insularity of reasons, where this is the claim that the rational support that our beliefs enjoy, even in 
the best case, can be no better than the rational support enjoyed by our envatted counterparts. It is 
only with this commitment in play that the underdetermination principle can generate the 
advertised sceptical conclusion.23  
I have argued elsewhere that we should reject both of these underlying claims.24 What is 
important for our present purposes, however, is that the way in which one motivates a denial of 
these claims is very different, as reflecting the fact that they are distinct sceptical sources leading to 
logically distinct formulations of the sceptical problem. It should be clear that Wittgenstein is 
offering us a straightforward way of denying the universality of rational evaluation thesis. In 
particular, he is proposing an alternative conception of how rational evaluation functions, one 
which is essentially constrained by our necessarily groundless hinge commitments.  
Does that mean that Wittgenstein is obliged to deny the closure principle? I don’t think so. 
The crux of the matter is that we need to take seriously how Wittgenstein characterises our hinge 
commitments as animal and visceral, in the sense that while they involve complete certainty in the 
target proposition they are neither the product of rational processes (e.g., they are not taught) nor 
are they ever responsive to rational considerations. Many interpreters of Wittgenstein don’t take 
this aspect of our hinge commitments at face-value, and that’s why they end up characterising 
them in such a way that allows for a degree of intellectual distance between us and the hinge 
propositions that we are committed to. So, for example, some commentators—most notably 
Crispin Wright (e.g., 2004)—characterise hinge commitments in terms of notions like acceptance 
or trust, propositional attitudes which are entirely compatible with agnosticism regarding the target 
proposition.25 Other commentators, such as Williams himself (as we saw above), characterise our 
hinge commitments as being, at least sometimes anyway, essentially optional (as when one can in 
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principle change one’s hinge commitments simply by taking off one’s lab coat). But this is clearly 
not what Wittgenstein had in mind.  
This point is important, since if we do take Wittgenstein’s own description of hinge 
commitments seriously then it becomes clear that our hinge commitments simply aren’t beliefs, at 
least not in the sense of belief that we have in mind when we think of the propositional attitude 
that is a constituent part of rationally grounded knowledge. Belief in this sense, after all, does bear 
certain basic conceptual connections to reason and truth, and is more than just an out-and-out 
commitment to the target proposition. (That’s why wishful thinking is not the same as believing, at 
least not in this sense of belief anyway). But this means that the closure principle that the sceptic 
appeals to in formulating closure-based scepticism is simply inapplicable to our hinge 
commitments. After all, this is a principle which is concerned with the acquisition of rationally 
grounded knowledge (and hence belief in the relevant sense) on the basis of the paradigmatically 
rational process of competent deduction. Neither is compatible with the notion of a hinge 
commitment if we follow Wittgenstein’s description of it, and hence we do not need to reject 
closure as it simply cannot be employed in the service of scepticism. The closure-based 
formulation of the sceptical paradox described above is thus not a genuine paradox at all, in that 
one cannot employ the closure principle to motivate the bridging claim at issue in (S12).
26  
Since Williams doesn’t stay true to Wittgenstein’s own characterisation of hinge 
commitments, he fails to see that there is this route out of closure-based scepticism. It thus 
becomes important to him to champion the kind of contextualism that we saw above to be 
problematic in order to show that the sceptic’s achievements are mitigated by being relative to a 
sceptical context of inquiry. But a bigger mistake that Williams makes is to try to extract from the 
Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation not just an answer to closure-based 
scepticism but also, in effect, underdetermination-based scepticism as well, via his rejection of 
epistemological realism and epistemic priority. We should be immediately suspicious of such a 
move. Why couldn’t it be the case that all rational evaluation is essentially local and that reasons are 
essentially insular? For example, perhaps it is both the case that all rational evaluation is local and 
that propositions regarding one’s mental states have an epistemic priority relative to propositions 
concerning one’s environment? There seems no obvious way of deriving the denial of the latter 
from the acceptance of the former. And yet that is precisely what Williams attempts to do.  
 The foregoing is of course consistent with the idea that if we only added a rejection of 
epistemological realism, and the epistemic priority thesis that (Williams claims) goes with it, to the 
Wittgensteinian account, then we would have an anti-sceptical response which dealt with both 
formulations of the sceptical paradox. If this were right, then Williams could at least salvage 
something from this anti-sceptical strategy. Unfortunately, even this redescribed version of 
 18 
Williams’ anti-sceptical strategy, such that it consists of two distinct anti-sceptical theses, doesn’t 
work.  
 We will focus on epistemic priority in this regard, since this is clearly the thesis that holds 
the whip hand in this regard as far as Williams is concerned. That is, he wants to renounce 
epistemological realism since it licences epistemic priority, where epistemic priority leads to radical 
scepticism and so has to go. Would the rejection of epistemic priority suffice to block the 
underdetermination-based radical sceptical paradox? 
 This might initially look quite plausible, in that one might think that if it is sometimes⎯as 
part of a particular context of inquiry⎯legitimate to rationally infer claims about one’s mental 
states from claims about the external world, then this must be in conflict with the insularity of 
reasons thesis, and hence with underdetermination-based radical scepticism. But this train of 
reasoning does not stand up to closer scrutiny. This is because it is in fact entirely consistent with 
the rejection of epistemic priority that the insularity of reasons thesis holds.  
 Suppose it is true, for example, that in certain psychological contexts of inquiry it may be 
legitimate to make inferences about one’s mental states from claims about the external world. Why 
should it follow from this that the insularity of reasons thesis is false? For notice that the latter 
claim is specifically about whether the rational support we have for our beliefs is necessarily 
compatible with the possibility that one’s beliefs are radically in error (i.e., such that we are 
rationally no better off than our envatted counterpart, who is radically in error). Why should it 
follow from the fact that a particular belief about one’s mental states can be rationally inferred 
from a particular belief about the external world that this latter possibility is excluded? In itself, all 
this shows is that some of our beliefs about our mental states might have a weaker epistemic 
pedigree than some of our beliefs about the external world, but there is nothing in this claim 
which is in conflict with the insularity of reasons thesis.  
 More generally, in rejecting the insularity of reasons thesis we are not thereby rejecting 
epistemic priority. Rejecting the insularity of reasons thesis means allowing that that the rational 
support enjoyed by our everyday beliefs can potentially exclude the possibility that we are in 
radical error, but this is entirely consistent with thinking of the direction of rational support in play 
as being from mind to world. Indeed, as we will see in a moment, there is a way of thinking about 
our reflectively accessible rational support such that it offers the favouring anti-sceptical support 
that we need to block the insularity of reasons thesis and thereby deal with underdetermination-
based radical scepticism, but which is nonetheless entirely compatible with epistemic priority. 
It seems, then, that denying epistemic priority is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
blocking underdetermination-based scepticism. It follows that Williams has not only misdiagnosed 
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the source of scepticism in virtue of failing to distinguish between the closure-based and 
underdetermination-based versions of this problem, but also misunderstood the extent to which 
the sceptical problem (of either form) essentially trades upon epistemic priority, and thus 
epistemological realism.  
While Williams does go wrong on this point, I think his philosophical instincts are sound. 
He clearly would regard the insularity of reasons thesis as dubious, and he’s right to do so. The 
way to deny this thesis, however, is not to become sidetracked in discussions about 
epistemological realism or epistemic priority—much less contextualism—but rather to embrace 
epistemological disjunctivism. This is the view that our everyday practices of offering factive reasons—
e.g., that one sees that p—in support of our perceptual beliefs in paradigmatic epistemic conditions 
should be taken at face-value (as oppposed to being rejected for dubious philosophical reasons). 
With this account in hand, there is a striaghtforward sense in which the insularity of reasons thesis 
is false, since in the right conditions one can have supporting perceptual reasons available to one 
which actually entail the target propoisition (unlike one’s envatted counterpart, who clearly will not 
enjoy rational support of this nature). Epistemological disjunctivism is thus the antidote to 
underdetermination-based scepticism, in that it offers a direct undercutting response to this variety 
of scepticism. Notice too that one can perfectly well characterise the rational support provided for 
one’s perceptual knowledge by one’s seeing that p as being of a mind-to-world kind, to there is no 
straightforward route from epistemological disjunctivism to the denial of epistemic priorty.27  
Of course, I cannot hope to offer a defence of epistemological disjunctivism here, much 
less to defend the idea that epsitemological disjunctivism can be combined with a Wittgensteinian 
epistemology to deal with both closure and underdetermination-based scepticism (though I have 
argued extensively for both claims elsewhere). My point is rather that once we recognise that these 
two formulations of radical scepticism are not just logically distinct, but also trade on discrete 
sources of scepticism, then it follows that our response to the problem of radical scepticism will 
need to be more subtle than Williams supposes. A Wittgensteinian epistemology—at least if 
construed in the way that I have proposed, rather than along inferential contextualist lines—offers 
us a compelling way of dealing with closure-based radical scepticism by enabling us to reject the 
universality of rational evalaution thesis while nontheless keeping closure intact. But it crucially 
doesn’t offer us any straightforward purchase on underdetermination-based scepticism as Williams 
supposes. To offer an undercutting response to this form of radical scepticism we need to reject 
the insularity of reasons thesis, and that requires one to motivate epistemological disjunctivism. 
The cure for epistemic angst thus doesn’t lie in Williams’s inferential contextualism, but rather 
requries the kind of biscopic approach to the problem that allies a Wittgensteinian epistemology to 
epistemological disjunscitivm. Radical scepticism certainly does involve ‘unnatural doubts’, but the 
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source of their peculiarity is not quite as Williams supposes.28 
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NOTES 
 
1  Note that henceforth when I refer to radical scepticism without qualification, it will be specifically Cartesian radical 
scepticism that I have in mind.    
2  My reasons for describing Williams’s contextualism as inferential is to distinguish it from the attributer/semantic 
contextualism—e.g., as defended by DeRose (1995) and Lewis (1996)—that often gets listed alongside Williams’s view, 
even though the two proposals are very different. See Pritchard (2002a; 2002b).    
3  Although the “hinge” metaphor is the dominant symbolism in the book, it is accompanied by various other 
metaphors, such as the following: that these propositions constitute the “scaffolding” of our thoughts (OC, §211); that 
they form the “foundations of our language-games” (OC, §§401-3); and also that they represent the implicit “world-
picture” from within which we inquire, the “inherited background against which [we] distinguish between true and 
false” (OC, §§94-5). 
4  This point marks an important contrast between Wittgenstein’s anti-scepticism and the superficially similar response 
to scepticism offered by Austin (1961). They are similar in that both emphasise the differences between sceptical 
doubt and everyday doubt. As Stroud (1984) so persuasively argued, however, it is open to the proponent of radical 
scepticism to embrace these differences while nonetheless maintaining that sceptical doubt is a purified version of 
everyday doubt (i.e., once the latter is stripped of purely pragmatic limitations, such as imagination, time, opportunity, 
ingenuity, and so on). Unlike Austin, however, Wittgenstein blocks even this move by demonstrating that the 
difference between sceptical doubt and everyday doubt is not a differences of degree but rather of kind, where one 
moves from a style of rational evaluation which is coherent to one which is simply incoherent. For further discussion 
of this point, see Pritchard (2011b; 2014b; 2015a, part two; forthcomingb).   
5  For a recent discussion of the distinction between undercutting and overriding anti-sceptical strategies, and its 
dialectical significance, see Pritchard (2015a, part one).  
6  For a different characterisation of Williams’s conception of epistemic priority, see Ribeiro (2002). 
7  A good point of comparison in this regard⎯a comparison which Williams himself draws⎯is the contextualist 
account of justification offered by Annis (1978).  
8  Or, at the very least, Williams regards closure-based radical scepticism as simply being a variant of 
underdetermination-based radical scepticism rather than logically distinct, where the latter connects most directly with 
the ‘veil of perception’, and thus with issues concerning epistemic priority which are Williams’s focus. See, for 
example, Williams (1991, ch. 8) where he discusses the former form of radical scepticism in some detail. See also 
Williams (2010, 196). 
9  Not least that it enables us to deal with closure-based radical scepeticism, as we will see below.  
10  This won’t come as a surprise to Williams, for he is quite explicit that his notion of a methodological necessity, 
while inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks on hinge commitments in On Certainty, is not meant to be an interpretation of 
this notion. See Williams (1991, ch. 1). 
11  Similar points apply to other putative methodological necessities of historical inquiry (or, for that matter, any other 
specific inquiry). Consider, for example, Williams’s claim that one such methodological necessity of this kind of 
inquiry concerns the general veracity of historical documentation. Notice that if there were a systematic deception in 
play with regard to all ‘official’ testimony regarding the past, then that would almost certainly be in conflict with one’s 
über hinge commitment. A commitment to the absence of such a systematic deception is thus a plausible manifestation 
of one’s general über hinge commitment. It follows that one will tend to regard historical documentation as generally 
veracious. By casting the commitment in question as being specifically concerned with historical documentation, 
Williams makes it look as if this is a commitment that is peculiar to a particular context of inquiry. But closer 
inspection of the kind of commitment in play reveals that it is no such thing, but rather just the manifestation of the 
more general über hinge commitment.  
12  See, for example, DeRose (1995) and Lewis (1996).   
13  That his conception of the structure of rational evaluation might lead to epistemic relativism of this kind is certainly 
a problem that Wittgenstein grapples with in On Certainty. Consider, for example, this famous passage:  
 
“Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares 
the other a fool and a heretic. 
I said I would ‘combat’, the other man,⎯but wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do 
they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think of what happens when missionaries convert 
natives).” (OC, §§611-12) 
 
I explore Wittgenstein’s treatment of epistemic relativism in more detail in Pritchard (2010). See also Pritchard (2009). 
Note that there are interesting issues here regarding Wittgenstein’s broader approach to the epistemology of religious 
belief and how this inter-relates both with his views about hinge commitments and with topics such as epistemic 
relativism. See Pritchard (2011a; 2015b). 
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14  Oddly, later on in the very same page cited here Williams seems to assert the very opposite of this claim and deny 
that there can be epistemic incommensurability. I discuss Williams’s ambivalent approach to these issues, including the 
logical tension between these two passages, at length in Pritchard (2010). See also endnote 15.  
15  It should be noted that Williams’s views on how inferential contextualism and epistemic relativism inter-relate are 
complex. He has argued at length that the former is in fact the “antidote” to the latter (see Williams 2007), and yet as 
we have noted he also seems to endorse epistemic incommensurability, which is the very kind of thing which 
generates epistemic relativism. I explore Williams’s account of how inferential contextualism relates to epistemic 
relativism in detail in Pritchard (2010). See also endnote 14.  
16  For further discussion of why the sceptical problem is best understood in terms of rationally grounded knowledge, 
see Pritchard (2015a, part one).  
17  Note that this formulation of radical scepticism is in fact much stronger than we need to generate the sceptical 
paradox. In particular, in terms of (S11), it would suffice, for example, that one does not⎯as opposed to the stronger 
cannot⎯have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV. Relatedly, it would suffice for (S12) that it follows 
from one’s lack of rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV that one lacks rationally grounded knowledge 
that E.  
18  Note that in order to keep matters simple I am setting to one side those responses to radical scepticism⎯e.g., 
Vogel (1990)⎯which claim that we have an abductive rational basis for preferring our everyday beliefs over sceptical 
alternatives. I critically discuss such a proposal in Pritchard (2015a, ch. 1). 
19  Note that here, and in what follows, we are taking it as given that one knows that E entails that one is not a BIV.  
20  In particular, the most famous rejections of closure-style principles as a means of blocking radical scepticism⎯due 
to Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981)⎯have been concerned with much weaker formulations of the closure principle, 
and hence do not straightforwardly apply to the closure principle as we have formulated it here. For a useful recent 
exchange on the status of closure-style principles, see Dretske (2005a; 2005b) and Hawthorne (2005).  
21  As with our formulation of the closure-based radical sceptical paradox above⎯see footnote 17⎯note that this 
formulation of radical scepticism is in fact much stronger than we need to generate the sceptical paradox. In particular, 
in terms of (S21), it would suffice, for example, that one does not⎯as opposed to the stronger cannot⎯have a rational 
basis which favours one’s belief that E over the BIV scenario. Relatedly, it would suffice for (S22) that it follows from 
one’s lack of such a favouring rational basis that one lacks rationally grounded knowledge that E. 
22  The loci classici as regards the new evil demon intuition are Lehrer & Cohen (1983) and Cohen (1984).  
23  For further discussion and defence of the idea that closure-based radical scepticism and underdetermination-based 
radical scpticism are logically distinct, and that they reflect two distinct sources of scepticism, see Pritchard (2015a, 
part one). See also Pritchard (2005a, part one; 2005b; forthcominga).  
24  See especially Pritchard (2015a). See also Pritchard (forthcominga). 
25  I critically explore Wright’s conception of hinge commitments in more detail in Pritchard (2014a). See also 
Pritchard (2012b).  
26  For more on this point, see Pritchard (2012b; 2014a; 2015a, part two; forthcominga).  
27  Though of course the epistemological disjunctivist’s conception of the mental realm is bound to be very different 
to the standard Cartesian conception. Epistemological disjunctivism is rooted in the work of McDowell (1995). For a 
full defence of this position, including its application to underdetermination-based scetpiciam, see Pritchard (2015a). 
See also Pritchard (2008; 2012a).  
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